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Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote that “[a] mob is a society of bodies 
voluntarily bereaving themselves of reason and traversing its work.  The mob is 
man voluntarily descending to the nature of the beast.”1  Emerson’s words echo 
a common view of the inherent inefficiencies of tasking groups with generating 
innovative solutions to complex problems.  Such a view is premised on the idea 
that the group will inevitably suppress effect on its wisest member, or, at best, 
will cause the wisest member to reach his solution in a much more inefficient 
manner than if that member had simply been asked to solve the problem alone.  
What if, however, the group was not inferior to the individual because it was a 
group, but simply because it was not effectively designed to capitalize on the 
expertise of each individual member?  What if such a group could be redesigned 
so that the solution it produced was superior to any solution that any individual 
member could generate alone?  Recent research indicates that groups can indeed 
produce superior solutions if they are designed to function as “wise crowds.”2  
Not all crowds are wise, but data repeatedly shows that solutions generated by a 
crowd meeting the criteria of a wise crowd are much more likely to be correct 
than the solutions produced by other decision-making mechanisms.3 
Although crowd wisdom is often applied to corporate organizations, it can 
also be applied to policy choices in democratic societies.4  Admittedly, crowd 
wisdom is not as naturally applicable to policy decisions because one choice is 
not always quantifiably superior to another choice.  Nevertheless, even if 
 1. R. W. EMERSON, Compensation, in ESSAYS 75, 98 (Boston, James Munroe & Co. 1841). 
 2. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 270 (2004) (“Choosing candidates 
and making policy in a democracy are not . . . cognition problems and so we should not expect 
them to yield themselves to the wisdom of the crowd.”). 
 3. Id. at 10. 
 4. Id. at 270 (“There’s no reason to believe that crowds would be wise in most situations but 
suddenly become doltish in the political arena.”). 
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demonstrating the superiority of one policy choice is difficult, there is no reason 
to think that removing policy choices from the democratic process produces 
worse outcomes.5  Trying to make policy choices with a mechanism designed to 
harness crowd wisdom has the potential to provide greater decisional advantages 
than the standard democratic process, to the extent that certain policy choices 
are subject to quantifiable, outcome-based comparisons. 
One logical policy area in which to apply crowd wisdom is educational policy, 
which currently exhibits a host of competing ideas for the best mechanism to 
improve student outcomes.  These competing ideas can be seen in the wide 
variety of schools that compete for resources to implement their approaches.  
Public schools, charter schools, magnet schools, International Baccalaureate 
programs, secular private schools, religious private schools, home schooling, 
and other models all offer unique approaches to education.  Even within these 
types of schools, different educational teaching philosophies abound.  Although 
some schools unquestionably achieve better outcomes for their students than 
others, educational policy analysts do not agree on the best method by which to 
measure the quality of any particular school because of the many factors 
involved in educating students.6  In other words, some schools are likely better 
than others, but separating strong schools from weak schools is difficult.  
Employing crowd wisdom may provide a better solution to this problem.  
Because there are so many competing educational models and so many variables 
that influence the success of educational programs, the information needed to 
determine which programs work for which communities is likely spread over a 
 5. See id. 
 6. Theresa Perry, The Historical and Contemporary Foundations for Robert Moses’s Call 
to Make Quality Education a Constitutionally Guaranteed Right, in QUALITY EDUCATION AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT vii, xi (Theresa Perry et al. eds., 2010) (“We don’t have an agreement of 
what constitutes quality education, nor does there seem to be a clear pathway to a constitutional 
amendment guaranteeing quality education.”).  For example, the amount of money spent on 
education is likely an imperfect proxy for measuring educational quality because 
low-spending states have a disproportionate share of poor, minority, and LEP children 
whose educational needs are only roughly taken into account by applying pupil weights 
to spending data.  Student demographics, parental education and income, and other 
aspects of family background undoubtedly play a role in explaining performance 
disparities across states.  Moreover, states vary in how they spend education funds, in 
their degree of intrastate finance equity, in the standards they set for teachers and 
students, and in the policy and regulatory environment they establish for schools and 
districts on matters ranging from collective bargaining to assessments and accountability.  
All of these factors likely bear on the efficacy of education spending and complicate the 
relationship between resources and results. 
Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2077–78 
& n.116 (2006) (citing several studies and articles that comment on the relationship between 
resources and student outcomes).  Although the relationship between resources and outcomes is 
imperfect, devoting increased resources to schools that rank in the lower margins of educational 
outcomes would likely have a positive effect.  See id. at 2078–82.  The complicated host of factors 
driving differences in educational outcomes likely explains disparities both among different states 
and within states themselves. 
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diverse population.  In addition, despite the disagreement about what constitutes 
educational quality, success can be measured with test scores, college 
placement, and lifetime earnings.  Accordingly, although educational quality is, 
in many respects, the type of difficult policy choice that may not benefit from 
crowd wisdom as much as a decision with a clear solution, many measures of 
educational success are quantifiable and educational quality policy can benefit 
from crowd wisdom principles. 
In order to apply crowd wisdom to educational policy choices, a mechanism 
must be in place to harness crowd wisdom and use it to improve educational 
quality.  The most common mechanism used to channel crowd wisdom in the 
United States is the democratic process.  However, this is an imperfect method 
of applying crowd wisdom to policy choices because it is difficult to reflect the 
many competing solutions to a policy problem on a ballot.7  Although one 
obvious solution is simply to empower the electorate to make more policy on a 
referendum basis, it is not ideal because mobilizing the voting apparatus for an 
election is inherently costly and time consuming, thus preventing innovative 
ideas from quickly emerging and testing themselves in the policy marketplace.  
Rather, a more responsive mechanism to harness crowd wisdom exists, in the 
form of tax incentives. 
This Article proposes that tax incentives are an effective way of channeling 
crowd wisdom to improve educational quality.  Specifically, the Article focuses 
on a new type of tax incentive with which several states have experimented: tax 
credits for contributions to organizations that fund scholarships and innovative 
educational programs.  Part I discusses the defining characteristics of a wise 
crowd.  Part II then explains why tax credits are the best mechanism for applying 
crowd wisdom to educational policy decisions.  Next, Part III considers school 
scholarship tax credit programs and illustrates how they can be most effectively 
used to create an appropriate mechanism for harnessing crowd wisdom.  Finally, 
the Article concludes that school scholarship tax credit programs should be 
expanded in a modified form because they are an effective mechanism for 
harnessing crowd wisdom and provide many of the benefits inherent in other 
school choice programs without as much controversy. 
I.  ACHIEVING CROWD WISDOM RATHER THAN MOB MENTALITY: THE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF A WISE CROWD 
Before proposing a mechanism through which crowd wisdom and state tax 
credits will improve educational quality, it is necessary to define the conditions 
in which a crowd-based decision is superior to an individualized or centralized 
decision.  Simply tasking a crowd—rather than an individual—with making a 
 7. See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 393 (1998) (noting that 
referendums are effective in determining whether the electorate affirmatively or negatively favored 
a particular proposition, but are not effective in determining how a particular policy choice should 
be implemented). 
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decision does not guarantee a superior result; in fact, a crowd could produce a 
vastly inferior result.8  For a crowd to qualify as a wise crowd, it must possess 
four characteristics: (1) diversity of opinion based on individual members’ 
private information; (2) independence, in that each member of the crowd must 
be able to form his judgment without influence from other crowd members;  
(3) decentralization, in that crowd members must be able to specialize base their 
opinions on local knowledge; and (4) aggregation, in that there must be some 
mechanism for the members to reach a collective decision from their individual 
judgments.9  Crowds possessing all four of these characteristics are likely to 
make better decisions than individuals10 because, assuming the crowd is large 
enough, individual errors will cancel each other out in the decision-making 
process.11  Fleshing out the requirements of each of these four characteristics is 
helpful to understand how a wise crowd is formed. 
A.  Diversity 
A wise crowd requires diversity, “not in a sociological sense, but rather in a 
conceptual and cognitive sense.”12  The best form of crowd diversity occurs on 
multiple levels: a diverse group of ideas, a diverse group of decision-makers to 
choose among those ideas, and a diverse group of funding sources for those 
ideas.13  Although this type of diversity does not guarantee that every idea will 
be successful, it does create an environment in which successful ideas are more 
likely to emerge and that unsuccessful ideas are removed from the marketplace 
relatively quickly.14  Of course, this type of diversity is much easier to achieve 
in large groups.15  A critical component of crowd diversity is that the members 
of the group must possess some level of information relevant to making a good 
decision, although each member need not have the same amount of 
information.16  Indeed, if the members of a group do have varying degrees of 
 8. SUROWIECKI, supra note 2, at xix. 
 9. Id. at 10. 
 10. A superior decision is not guaranteed one hundred percent of the time; rather, it is simply 
more likely that a wise crowd will make a decision superior to that of an individual.  See id. at  
34–35. 
 11. Id. at 10.  Once the errors have been cancelled out, only the crowd’s collective information 
remains.  Id.  However, “even with the errors canceled out, it’s possible that a group’s judgment 
will be bad.  For the group to be smart, there has to be at least some information in the ‘information’ 
part of the ‘information minus error’ equation.”  Id. 
 12. Id. at 28. 
 13. See id.  When such diversity exists, “the chances that at least someone will take a gamble 
on a radical or unlikely idea obviously increases.”  Id. 
 14. See id. at 28–29. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. at 31.  Although choosing group members who possess at least some degree of useful 
information is ideal for a wise crowd, determining exactly who should be in a particular group is 
so difficult that it is generally better to simply select the group randomly; spending time trying to 
determine precisely who should be in the group usually is a wasted effort.  See id. at 276. 
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information, this group should produce better results than two individuals with 
high intelligence and large amounts of information.17  Finally, it is beneficial if 
there is an incentive system in place to encourage group members to focus on 
achieving the best outcomes.18 
B.  Independence 
In order for the group to be wise, the members must also have the ability to 
make individual evaluations as free as possible from the influence of the other 
group members.19  Independence is necessary because “[t]he more influence we 
exert on each other, the more likely it is that we will believe the same things and 
make the same mistakes.”20  The most effective way to achieve independence in 
a group is to require the members make decisions simultaneously, or as close to 
simultaneously as possible, rather than in sequence.21 
C.  Decentralization 
The third essential characteristic to a wise crowd is decentralization, which, 
combined with specialization, maximizes the benefits of different, informed 
points of view.22  Decentralization is critical to harnessing group members’ 
innate knowledge that cannot easily be communicated to other members.23  This 
tacit, specialized knowledge is critical because the individuals closest to a 
problem likely possess superior knowledge for solving the problem than a 
centralized authority.24  Decentralization indicates that crowd wisdom is most 
effective if an organization or entity allows local problems to be addressed at the 
local level rather than at a centralized level.25  This can produce an overall more 
effective organization that embodies the sum of these individualized solutions, 
as opposed to top-down solutions imposed throughout the organization.26 
Although decentralization fosters an environment in which specialists can 
apply their unique, independent perspectives toward solving a problem, it is not 
 17. See id. at 31. 
 18. See id. at 20.  Interestingly, these incentives do not necessarily need to be financial nor do 
they necessarily need to be large in order to achieve the desired effect.  Id. at 279–80.  Determining 
the appropriate incentive level can nevertheless be difficult so that the incentive does not distort 
behavior towards an solution away from the ideal one.  Id. at 280. 
 19. Id. at 42–43. 
 20. Id. at 42.  When independence breaks down, a group may “become individually smarter 
but collectively dumber.”  Id. 
 21. Id. at 64. 
 22. See id. at 71 (explaining that specialization “increases the scope and the diversity of the 
opinions and information in the system”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (noting that the concept of decentralization and its benefit to problem solving dates 
back to ancient Athens). 
 25. See id. at 211–12. 
 26. See id. at 212. 
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particularly efficient.27  Without some process to aggregate the group members’ 
various solutions, there is a risk that valuable information will not be 
disseminated to or valued by the rest of the group.28  A decentralization system 
without a mechanism to mitigate this inefficiency will not necessarily be more 
advantageous than a centralized one.29 
D.  Aggregation 
In order to address the inefficiencies inherent to a decentralized system, a wise 
crowd requires a centralizing mechanism to aggregate the individual judgments 
of the group into a final decision.30  Without aggregation, a group that satisfies 
the first three conditions of a wise crowd may achieve the solution proposed by 
the smartest, best-informed member of the group, but that result is not certain.31  
However, with an aggregating mechanism in place, the group’s collective 
solution is more likely to be superior to even the smartest individual group 
member’s solution.32 
II.  HARNESSING THE CROWD TO IMPROVE EDUCATION: BALLOTS, VOUCHERS, 
DEDUCTIONS, OR TAX CREDITS? 
If crowd wisdom is to be applied to educational policy choices, there are 
several competing mechanisms that could be employed to harness it.  The 
simplest choice is to subject policy options to the democratic voting process.  In 
the alternative, crowd wisdom could be channeled by allowing the crowd to 
direct public funding to different educational programs through the use of 
voucher systems or tax incentives.  The use of tax incentives, specifically tax 
credits, is the best mechanism by which to satisfy the requirements of a wise 
crowd. 
A.  Tax Incentives Are a Better Mechanism for Harnessing Crowd Wisdom 
Than Ballot-Based Voting 
If harnessing crowd wisdom requires discerning the preferences of an 
electorate, it is tempting to accomplish this by transferring policy choices from 
government officials to the public through the referendum process.  However, 
succumbing to this temptation ignores a mechanism that can better accomplish 
this goal.  Tax incentives, described as using “taxes as ballots,” can be much 
more effective than ballot-based voting in channeling the electorate’s various 
 27. See id. at 72–73. 
 28. Id. at 71–72. 
 29. See id. at 74 (“[A] decentralized system can only produce genuinely intelligent results if 
there’s a means of aggregating the information of everyone in the system.”). 
 30. See id. at 74–75. 
 31. Id. at 75. 
 32. Id. 
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policy preferences.33  Tax incentives are not necessarily a viable option for 
determining policy in areas in which legislatures are highly unlikely to cede their 
authority to the public.34  However, in areas in which citizens have better 
information than the government, incentivizing citizens to express their 
individual preferences through tax incentives rather than through a ballot 
initiative increases the likelihood that parties with superior information allocate 
funding toward preferential policy outcomes.35 
In the policy areas that benefit more from local knowledge, a properly 
structured tax incentive also has the benefit of better satisfying the requirements 
of a wise crowd.  Such a tax incentive enhances diversity because many different 
organizations can compete for taxpayer contributions, thus expanding the range 
of available policy options.36  In addition, tax incentives can strengthen 
decentralization if they are tailored to incentivize taxpayers to express their 
policy preferences at the regional level.37  Tax incentives can also serve as an 
aggregating mechanism if they are structured to incentivize contributions to 
organizations that can help centralize taxpayer preferences. 
Admittedly, tax incentives, if structured incorrectly, could also make a crowd 
less wise.  Diversity could suffer if only certain taxpayers are able to take 
advantage of the tax incentive.  For example, taxpayers who do not itemize their 
deductions are not eligible to take a charitable deduction and thus are 
discouraged from using the tax incentive.38  In addition, if a tax incentive is 
structured to give a greater incentive to taxpayers with more resources, any 
 33. Levmore, supra note 7, at 387–89 (analyzing the benefits of tax incentives as a vehicle 
for democratizing policy choices in the specific context of charitable deductions). 
 34. Id. at 427 (“[I]t would be startling to find direct democracy of any kind with respect to the 
question of where to build new military bases, when to offer exemptions from antitrust law, or the 
extent to which patent and copyright monopolies ought to be extended.”). 
 35. Id. at 427–28.  For example: 
Voters across the country are unlikely to be well informed about my local hospital or 
your university, so a conventional exercise in direct democracy would not delegate 
decisionmaking to better informed parties. However, alumni of your university and 
citizens of my local community might be fairly well informed about their respective 
organizations. 
Id. 
 36. Tax incentives also better satisfy the independence prong.  Taxpayers have much less 
information about other taxpayers’ use of tax incentives than they do about other voters’ voting 
preferences because the media does not regularly release polling data about tax incentives.  Without 
this data, taxpayers are free to exercise their own independent judgment.  Although the increase in 
independence is likely not as significant as the increase in diversity, improvements on independence 
could nevertheless contribute to making the crowd wiser. 
 37. See Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 562 (2008) (noting that 
the decision to make a charitable contribution, which makes the taxpayer eligible for a tax incentive, 
may depend on where the taxpayer lives). 
 38. Id. (“[T]axpayers who do not itemize their deductions at all because the standard 
deduction exceeds the total value of the deductions they could itemize effectively have no ‘vote’ 
over the use of government resources.  Their gifts to charity generate no rebate at all from the 
government.”). 
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advantages may be counteracted by the corresponding decrease in the overall 
size of the pool of decision-makers.  This would negate the benefits of having a 
highly diverse crowd that possesses degrees of information to make decisions.39  
However, properly structuring the tax incentive to reach as many taxpayers as 
possible addresses many of these concerns. 
B.  Tax Incentives Are a Better Mechanism for Harnessing Crowd Wisdom 
Than Vouchers and Correct Inherent Problems That Have Made Voucher 
Systems Controversial 
Tax incentives are also a better mechanism for generating diverse approaches 
to education.  Voucher systems operate by using public money to give students 
the choice of attending a private school instead of a public school.  Proponents 
of voucher systems tout them as a way of improving education by increasing 
competitiveness between public and private schools.40  Critics argue that these 
systems actually accomplish the opposite by weakening the public school 
system—because vouchers shift funds and high-achieving students into private 
schools—and by creating a system in which students become trapped in 
deteriorating public school systems that do not have a realistic chance of 
improvement.41  Furthermore, critics point out that the private schools that 
receive voucher-supported students are primarily religious, which causes a 
transfer of public funds for religious education and potentially violates the 
Establishment Clause.42  Even voucher programs that are tailored to pass 
constitutional scrutiny are problematic43 because state Blaine Amendments 
 39. But see Levmore, supra note 7, at 406 (arguing that objections to harnessing voter 
preferences regarding charitable deductions through tax incentives “may be overcome for some by 
the substantial ‘voter turnout’ that is induced by the tax deduction scheme, and by the fact that the 
government may need all the help it can get in monitoring and choosing among hospitals, schools, 
social welfare agencies, and the like”). 
 40. Jonathan D. Boyer, Education Tax Credits: School Choice Initiatives Capable of 
Surmounting Blaine Amendments, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 120 (2009) (noting that 
proponents also argue that voucher programs promote consumer choice and enhance parents’ rights 
to determine the best way to educate their children). 
 41. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary, State Tax Credits for Private Education: The 
Arizona Experience in Kotterman v. Killian, 136 EDUC. L. REP. 647, 654–55, 659–60 (1999); see 
also Boyer, supra note 40, at 120. 
 42. See Boyer, supra note 40, at 120.  The use of public funds is a critical component of 
voucher programs because private funds alone are insufficient to fund them.  Mawdsley, supra note 
41, at 654–55.  However, voucher programs that use public funds are subject to attack on the 
grounds that they violate the Establishment Clause by advancing religion.  See William G. Frey  
& Virginia Lynn Hogben, Vouchers, Tuition Tax Credits, and Scholarship-Donation Tax Credits: 
A Constitutional and Practical Analysis, 31 STETSON L. REV. 165, 166, 168–71 (2002) (discussing 
Commissioner for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon, two 
companion cases that established that voucher systems do not violate the Establishment Clause if 
they offer students the option to attend either public or private schools). 
 43. For a voucher program to have the best chance of surviving a constitutional challenge, it 
must offer the same aid to both public and private school students, which can be accomplished by 
providing vouchers for public school students to attend other public schools as well as private 
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prevent them from becoming a national solution.44  Blaine Amendments, which 
were added to many state constitutions in the late nineteenth century to reflect 
anti-Catholic sentiments, prohibit the allocation of state funds to religious 
schools.45 
Tax credits and tax deductions are more likely to survive Blaine Amendment 
challenges than voucher programs.46  Unlike voucher programs, which involve 
the direct transfer of public funds to religions schools, refundable tax credits and 
tax deductions benefit religious schools indirectly because public money is 
transferred to individual taxpayers, who have already chosen to spend their 
money to fund religious schools.47  Tax credit scholarship programs, with which 
schools.  See Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 177 (discussing the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
surrounding the constitutionality of voucher programs); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private 
Education and the Middle Class City, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 217–18 (2010) (noting that Zelmon 
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–64 (2002) likely resolved this issue definitively at the 
federal level by holding that religiously neutral scholarship programs were constitutionally 
permissible, even if the practical effect was that most beneficiaries chose religious education). 
 44. See, e.g., Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 182–83; Garnett, supra note 43, at 217–18; 
Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557, 
577 (2008). 
 45. See Boyer, supra note 40, at 118; Moe, supra note 44, at 577. 
 46. Boyer, supra note 40, at 145–47.  Similarly, tax deductions and credits generally will 
survive federal Establishment Clause challenges, provided that similar deductions or credits are 
provided to families of students who attend public schools.  Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at  
183–84 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–403 (1983)) (“This different treatment of tax 
deductions is consistent with basic Establishment Clause principles because a true tax deduction or 
credit reduces taxes, rather than paying out public money obtained from other taxpayers.”). 
 47. Boyer, supra note 40, at 146.  However, this argument could theoretically be challenged 
by applying tax expenditure theory to argue that these types of tax deductions or credits really do 
constitute the direct expenditure of public funds.  Tax expenditure theory, first proposed by 
Professor Stanley Surrey, posits “that tax credits, deductions, and exemptions are similar to direct 
governmental expenditures because they provide special benefits to favored individuals and result 
in higher tax rates for all other individuals.”  Christopher A. Bishop, Comment, Revisiting Article 
I, Section 5 of the Oregon Constitution: The Application of Priest v. Pearce and an Evaluation of 
the Oregon School Tax Credit, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 427, 468 (2002).  The primary criticisms 
of this theory are that: (1) it rests on the mistaken assumption that all property fundamentally 
belongs to the government and that the government simply refrains from taking what rightfully 
belongs to it when it allows a tax expenditure or deduction; (2) when the government chooses to 
enact a tax deduction or credit, it is choosing to omit certain entities or transactions from the tax 
base; and (3) the theory rests on the premise that there is an ideal level of taxation, departures from 
which must be viewed as tax expenditures.  Id. (quoting Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the 
Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 996–99 (1999)). 
Tax expenditure theory, if applied to Establishment Clause or Blaine Amendment challenges, could 
potentially put tax deductions and credits on the same footing as vouchers, in that both would be 
considered government spending.  Id. at 468–69 (“While some scholars have argued that the tax 
expenditure theory be applied to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, others reject this theory.  
Furthermore, scholars and state courts alike have recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet 
to apply this theory when interpreting the Establishment Clause.”).  However, there is considerable 
tension among the U.S. Supreme Court justices as to whether tax expenditure theory should be 
applied to these types of cases, with a bare majority currently holding that tax credits are not the 
equivalent of government expenditures.  See Edward Shaoul, Comment, Arizona Christian School 
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taxpayers receive credits or deductions for contributing to organizations that 
then award scholarships, provide even better insulation to Blaine Amendment 
challenges.48  Public funding is separated from the religious organization by at 
least two levels of decision-makers—the taxpayer and the organization that 
awards the scholarships—thus making it harder to argue that the public is 
directly funding the religious organization.49 
C.  Credits Are a Better Mechanism for Harnessing Crowd Wisdom Than 
Deductions 
Once policymakers decide to attempt to harness crowd wisdom with tax 
incentives, they must determine the best way to structure the incentives.  This 
requires them to choose between two fundamental types of tax incentives: partial 
credits and deductions.50  Although deductions and credits can often be 
structured to yield the same economic results—at least with regard to taxpayers 
in the same tax bracket51—there are critical differences between the two 
structures that can influence which approach is better for a particular policy goal.  
Understandably, each approach has both advantages and disadvantages, and the 
preferred mechanism will likely depend on the specific policy goals. 
One of the most significant differences between deductions and credits is that 
deductions are more valuable to taxpayers in higher tax brackets, whereas credits 
have the same value to all taxpayers, regardless of their tax bracket.52  
Consequently, deductions are the better option in situations in which the goal is 
to measure the income to be taxed, while credits are better used in situations in 
which the primary goal is to incentivize certain behaviors because they provide 
Tuition Organization v. Winn: Reconsidering Flast’s Exception to the Rule Against Taxpayer 
Standing and Establishing the Tax Credit Distinction, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 305, 311 (2011). 
 48. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 43, at 217–18 (comparing, for example, Arizona’s school 
scholarship tax credit program, which survived a constitutional challenge, and a limited voucher 
program, which was invalidated on Blaine Amendment grounds).   Several states have authorized 
these types of tax incentives for school tuition organizations.  See infra Part III.A. 
 49. Boyer, supra note 40, at 146–47; see also Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 186.  
Furthermore, 
tax credits for [school tuition organization] contributions are often designed specifically 
to test this illusive boundary of indirectness, as they require a number of entities to 
participate in the creation of an elaborate chain of financial exchanges. Employing such 
an elaborate design presents a strong opportunity for school-choice advocates to test the 
bounds of indirectness that Blaine Amendment jurisprudence is grappling with. 
Boyer, supra note 40, at 146–47. 
 50. Full credits (as opposed to partial ones) are not as viable of a policy choice because they 
create a costless mechanism of directing government funds that could cause potential recipients to 
compete so aggressively for these funds that true individual preferences might be distorted or 
masked.  See Levmore, supra note 7, at 409–11.  Attaching a cost to a vote could cause the voter 
to take his vote more seriously.  Id. at 411. 
 51. See id. at 414 (“[I]n most cases, a less-than-full credit can be offered as a perfect substitute 
for a tax deduction.”). 
 52. Id. 
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equal incentives to all taxpayers.53  For example, the federal tax incentive to 
encourage charitable donations could be structured as a deduction (because a 
potential policy goal is to measure taxable income after taxpayers make 
charitable contributions) or as a credit (because the potential purpose of the 
incentive is to encourage charitable giving).54  The number of taxpayers that 
claim a deduction for donations to religious organizations may have tipped the 
scales in favor of structuring the incentive as a deduction.55  If a tax incentive 
significantly benefits religious organizations, structuring the incentive as a 
deduction rather than as a credit may help to avoid constitutional challenges by 
allowing the government to argue that it is simply measuring taxable income 
rather than directly incentivizing contributions to religious organizations.56 
A significant advantage of credits—as long as they are refundable—is that 
they affect a much broader tax base than deductions because many taxpayers 
have no income tax liability and therefore do not benefit from deductions.57  
Indeed, tax credits are most efficient if offered at the lowest possible rate and to 
the broadest possible group because the utility of consumption diminishes at 
higher income levels.58  Although increasing the tax base eligible for the 
incentive could also be accomplished with an “above-the-line” deduction (for 
which all tax filers are eligible) or a “below-the-line” deduction (for which only 
deduction itemizers are eligible), this mechanism is still inferior to a credit for 
reducing the inequitable benefits received by taxpayers based solely on their tax 
bracket.59 
 53. Id.; see also Jenn, supra note 37, at 570 (noting that deductions offer different incentives 
for different types of taxpayers). 
 54. Levmore, supra note 7, at 415. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24, 28–29 (2006) (“Unlike other forms of tax incentives, a uniform 
refundable credit is not related to a household’s marginal tax rate and provides cash payments to 
qualifying households even if they owe no income tax.”); see also Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, 
at 184; Adele Robinson, Risky Credit: Tuition Tax Credits and Issues of Accountability and Equity, 
11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 257–58 (2000).  The refundable nature of the tax credit is key, 
especially if the incentive is designed to serve a policy goal in which taxpayers with little to no tax 
liability are significantly interested beneficiaries or contributors. Batchelder et al., supra, at 54; see 
also Jenn, supra note 37, at 571. 
 58. Jenn, supra note 37, at 574. 
 59. See id. at 572.  Horizontal equity—the equitable norm requiring similar treatment for 
similarly situated individuals—is a significant concern because a weakening of horizontal equity 
can have negative effects on taxpayer morale.  See id. at 563.  Interestingly, deductions provide 
incentives not only to taxpayers at different income levels, but also to taxpayers located in different 
geographic locations because certain regions have higher itemization rates than others.  See id. at 
571–72. 
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Additionally, refundable credits structure tax incentives in a more 
economically efficient manner than deductions.60  However, these advantages 
rest on the assumption that taxpayer responsiveness to tax incentives does not 
vary based on income level.61  If this assumption is incorrect, deductions may 
be a more efficient incentive mechanism because they can easily be structured 
to create different incentives across income ranges.62  Furthermore, providing 
differential incentives through deductions could theoretically promote economic 
efficiency because taxpayers with higher incomes produce greater positive 
externalities by engaging in the incentivized behavior.63  This argument justifies 
structuring the tax incentive for charitable donations as a deduction rather than 
as a credit, thereby creating greater incentive for high-income taxpayers to make 
charitable donations than for lower-income taxpayers.64  Because it is nearly 
impossible to measure where and how such systematic variations  
occur—assuming that they occur at all—the potential efficiency benefits of 
deductions remain largely theoretical.65  Therefore, credits remain the more 
practical choice for maximizing efficiency. 
 60. Batchelder et al., supra note 57, at 47–49 (arguing that “uniform refundable credits are 
generally the most efficient way to structure individual income tax incentives” because these credits 
minimize economic deadweight loss by reducing the number of large errors that occur in favor of 
a higher frequency of smaller errors); see also Jenn, supra note 37, at 574 (“A tax incentive that 
applies uniformly across taxpayers of all different statuses has the further efficiency advantage that 
it generally minimizes the expected error in the application of the incentive.”); Deborah M. Weiss, 
Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1949, 1973–74 (1994) (explaining that tax law 
prefers credits to deductions “primarily in those provisions that are social welfare measures rather 
than tax incentives”).  However, credits complicate the tax code and “can undermine fairness in the 
distribution of tax burdens.”  Robinson, supra note 57, at 254, 258–59.  Deductions could at least 
theoretically improve efficiency by reducing individual marginal tax rates and, therefore, the 
deadweight cost of taxation.  However, because current marginal tax rates are lower and flatter than 
they have been in the past, it is unclear if deductions actually generate these potential efficiency 
benefits.  Jenn, supra note 37, at 569. 
 61. See Batchelder et al., supra note 57, at 27–28 & n.16; Jenn, supra note 37, at 575. 
 62. Batchelder et al., supra note 57, at 27–28 & n.16; Jenn, supra note 37, at 575–76.  Of 
course, for those differential incentives to function as intended, taxpayers must be aware of their 
marginal tax rate, which is far from guaranteed.  Jenn, supra note 37, at 580. 
 63. Jenn, supra note 37, at 576. 
 64. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 427–28 (“Some large contributors will be especially well 
informed, as members of governing boards, or simply because they investigate before 
‘investing.’”).  But see Jenn, supra note 37, at 562 (arguing that the charitable deduction is 
fundamentally undemocratic because it gives undue influence to taxpayers in higher tax brackets 
solely because they have higher incomes).  Deductions may also be inequitable because each dollar 
contributed by a taxpayer in a higher tax bracket directs a larger share of government resources 
than a dollar contributed by a taxpayer in a lower tax bracket.  Id. 
 65. See Jenn, supra note 37, at 576–77 (“Ultimately, to presume that a tax incentive could be 
tailored to follow the contours of income-based variations in behavioral responses would seem to 
be an exercise in technocratic hubris.”). 
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III.  DESIGNING AN EDUCATIONAL TAX CREDIT TO HARNESS CROWD WISDOM 
Having concluded that tax incentives are preferable to vouchers and that tax 
credits are generally preferable to deductions, the next step is to determine how 
a tax credit should be structured to benefit from crowd wisdom.  Several states 
have implemented educational tax credit programs that serve as helpful 
examples in the attempt to structure such a credit.66  Although these programs 
differ from state to state, most of the programs provide credits to taxpayers for 
contributions made to school scholarship organizations.  These organizations 
then award money to students to assist them in attending private schools, thereby 
providing greater insulation from Establishment Clause and Blaine Amendment 
challenges than other forms of educational tax incentives and vouchers.67  This 
enhanced protection from state and federal constitutional challenges allows 
school scholarship organization tax credit programs to be much more flexible in 
their design than voucher programs.68  For example, to prevent claims of 
religious discrimination, some voucher programs require private schools to 
accept students without regard to admissions standards.69  School scholarship 
organization tax credits programs do not impose this type of restriction, which 
 66. The Friedman Foundation maintains a summary of scholarship tuition organization 
related legislation on its website.  See School Choice Programs, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. 
CHOICE, www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-programs.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 
2014). 
 67. See supra Part II.B. (discussing why tax incentives generally are superior to vouchers for 
withstanding Establishment Clause and Blaine Amendment challenges); see also supra notes  
48–49 and accompanying text (discussing why school scholarship tax credits stand on firmer state 
and federal constitutional grounds than even other educational tax incentives). 
School scholarship organization credits are also be on stronger footing with respect to state 
education clause and tax uniformity constitutional challenges.  See Garnett, supra note 43, at  
218–19 (quoting Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2006)) (noting that the Florida Supreme 
Court held that a state voucher program violated the Florida’s education clause, which required the 
state to maintain a “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of public education”); 
see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Winn for Educational Pluralism, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 31,  
33–36 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/a-winn 
-for-educational-pluralism/ (pointing out that Arizona upheld a similar tax credit program). 
Finally, school scholarship organization credits do not exacerbate horizontal tax inequity or 
economic inefficiency as significantly as direct credits or deductions, which treat taxpayers with 
similar income levels differently solely based on their decision to send their children to private 
schools.  Robinson, supra note 57, at 258.  School scholarship organization credits avoid this 
problem because the different treatment is based on the taxpayer’s decision to contribute to a school 
scholarship organization without regard to whether the taxpayer actually chose to enroll a child in 
a private school.  Furthermore, school scholarship organizations are more economically efficient 
because they are less likely to incentivize behavior that the taxpayer is already undertaking, 
regardless of the potential tax benefit.  But see Vada Waters Lindsey, The Vulnerability of Using 
Tax Incentives in Wisconsin, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 107, 113 (2004) (arguing that school scholarship 
credits can still weaken both horizontal and vertical equity). 
 68. Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 186–87. 
 69. Id. 
                                                 
2014] Harnessing Taxpayer Choices to Improve Educational Quality 311 
encourages schools with more rigorous admissions criteria to participate.70  As 
a result, school scholarship organization tax credits better harness crowd wisdom 
by ensuring that a diverse group of schools participates in the program. 
A.  Overview of School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs 
1.  Alabama 
Beginning with tax year 2013, Alabama offers a tax credit for contributions 
made during the tax year to school scholarship granting organizations.71  The 
credit is limited to no more than the lesser of fifty percent of the taxpayer’s tax 
liability or $7,500 per individual taxpayer or married couple filing jointly.72  
Corporate taxpayers may also claim a credit up to fifty percent of their tax 
liability for the year.73  The state caps the total amount of credits it issues at $25 
million.74  Unused credits can be carried forward for three years.75  Scholarship 
granting organizations then make awards to qualifying low-income and  
middle-class public school students to assist them in attending either a private 
school or another public school that is performing at a higher level than the 
student’s current school.76  Donations to scholarship granting organizations 
cannot be earmarked for particular students.77 
2.  Arizona 
Arizona provides a tax credit (initially $500 for individuals and $1,000 for 
married couples filing jointly), adjusted for inflation, as well as an additional 
supplementary credit under its “switcher” program, for contributions to school 
tuition organizations.78  Any remaining balance of the credit can be carried 
forward for five years if the taxpayer does not use it within the taxable year in 
 70. Id. 
 71. ALA. CODE § 16-6D-9(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).  Alabama also provides an 
individual tax credit directly to parents to fund moving their children from failing public schools to 
either non-failing public schools or private schools.  Id. § 16-6D-8(a)(1). 
 72. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(2). 
 73. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(3). 
 74. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(3). 
 75. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(4). 
 76. Id. § 16-6D-4. 
 77. Id. § 16-6D-9(b)(1)(n). 
 78. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2006 & Supp. 2012); id. § 43-1089.03 (Supp. 2012).  
In 2014, the caps were $528 for individuals and $1,056 for married taxpayers filing jointly.  Arizona 
– Original Individual Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. 
CHOICE, http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/Personal-Tax-Credits-for-School 
-Tuition-Organizations.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).  In 2014, the caps for the supplementary 
“switcher” credit were $525 for individuals and $1050 for married taxpayers filing jointly, although 
the taxpayers may not use the “switcher” credits until they exceed the caps under the original credit.  
Arizona – “Switcher” Individual Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR 
EDUC. Choice, http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/-Switcher--Individual-Income 
-Tax-Credit-Scholarship-Program.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
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which he made the contribution.79  The taxpayer cannot designate the donation 
for his own benefit, the benefit of a dependent, or the benefit of a specific 
student.80  Similarly, school tuition organizations cannot limit scholarships to 
recipients at only one school.81 
Corporate taxpayers may also be eligible for income and premium tax credits 
for contributions to school tuition organizations.82  Although many of the 
limitations on corporate tax credits are similar to the limitations on individual 
tax credits,83 corporate credits are limited primarily at the aggregate level.84  
Specifically, they are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, with an 
aggregate limitation initially of $10 million (increased twenty percent per year 
beginning in 2007) for donations to school tuition organizations serving 
traditional schools and $5 million for donations to school tuition organizations 
serving schools for the disabled or the displaced.85 
3.  Florida 
Florida grants a credit against a variety of taxes for contributions to eligible 
scholarship funding organizations.86  Although the credits are generally one 
hundred percent tax credits, Florida imposes specific limitations on the 
calculation and amount of the credit, depending on the type of tax that is being 
credited.87  The credit is distributed on a first-come, first-served basis is capped 
state-wide initially at $140 million per fiscal year, although the state will 
increase the cap if the amount of the credits awarded approaches it.88  Unused 
credits can be carried over with state approval.89 
 79. Id. § 43-1089(D) (Supp. 2012). 
 80. Id. § 43-1089(F) (Supp. 2012).  Taxpayers may not circumvent this provision by entering 
into agreements with other taxpayers to reciprocally designate their respective donations for the 
benefit of each other’s dependents.  Id.  However, taxpayers, are permitted to make 
recommendations regarding student beneficiaries.  Id. § 43-1603(B)(3) (Supp. 2012). 
 81. Id. § 43-1603(B)(2) (Supp. 2012). 
 82. See id. §§ 20-224.07 (Supp. 2012), 43-1183 (Supp. 2012), 1184 (Supp. 2012). 
 83. Compare id. § 20-224.07, and id. § 43-1089 (Supp. 2012), with id. § 43-1183, and id.  
§ 1184. 
 84. Id. §§ 43-1183, 1184. 
 85. Id. §§ 43-1183(c), 1184(c).  In 2014, the total aggregate cap was $35.8 million per year 
for the low-income corporate tax credit.  Arizona – Low-Income Corporate Income Tax Credit 
Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, http://www.edchoice.org/School 
-Choice/Programs/Corporate-Tax-Credits-for-School-Tuition-Organizations.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2014). 
 86. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.0251 (West 2011), 212.1831 (West 2011), 220.1875 (West 
Supp. 2012), 561.1211 (West Supp. 2012), 624.51055 (West Supp. 2012). 
 87. Id. §§ 211.0251, 212.1831, 220.1875, 561.1211, 624.51055. 
 88. Id. § 1002.395(5) (West 2012).  In 2014, the statewide cap was $286.25 million per year.  
Florida – Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, 
http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/Florida-Tax-Credit-Scholarship-Program.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
 89. Id. § 1002.395(5)(c). 
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The scholarship funding organizations provide scholarships to students who 
cannot afford private school or must attend public schools outside of their 
districts or lab schools.90  These scholarships are awarded on a first-come,  
first-served basis, although students already receiving the scholarships receive 
priority.91  Scholarships cannot be restricted for use at a specific school or for 
the benefit of the children of the owners or operators of scholarship funding 
organizations or eligible private schools.92  Additionally, there are limits on the 
amount of money that a scholarship funding organization can award to a 
particular student, which vary depending on the year, the type of scholarship, 
and the student’s household income.93 
4.  Georgia 
Georgia allows individuals donating to student scholarship organizations to 
take a credit of the lesser of $1,000 ($2,500 for married taxpayers filing jointly) 
or the amount donated, but individuals who are members, shareholders, or 
partners of pass-through entities can claim a credit up to $10,000 of the taxes 
they pay in their capacity as members or partners.94  Corporations receive a 
credit of the lesser of seventy-five percent of their income tax liability or the 
amount donated.95  Unused portions of the credit can be carried forward for five 
years.96  Credits are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, and there is an 
aggregate statewide cap for the credits, originally set at $50 million and adjusted 
for inflation until January 1, 2018.97  Taxpayers claiming the credit may not 
direct their donation to one of their dependents.98  Any Georgia public school 
student is eligible to receive benefits, which they must use for tuition and fees at 
private schools.99 
5.  Indiana 
Indiana provides a credit equal to fifty percent of the amount that a taxpayer 
contributes to a school scholarship granting organization.100  Unused credits 
 90. Id. § 1002.395(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012), 1.002.395(6)(d) (West 2012). 
 91. Id. § 1002.395(6)(e)–(f) (West 2012). 
 92. Id. § 1002.395(6)(g) (West 2012). 
 93. Id. § 1002.395(12) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012). 
 94. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-29.16(b) (2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 95. Id. § 48-7-29.16(c) (2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 96. Id. § 48-7-29.16(e) (2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 97. Id. § 48-7-29.16(f) (2009 & Supp. 2012).  For 2014, the cap was $58 million.   
Georgia – Qualified Education Expense Tax Credit, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, 
http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/Private-School-Tax-Credit-for-Donations-to 
-Student-Scholarship-Organizations.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
 98. Id. § 48-7-29.16(d) (2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 99. Id. §§ 20-2A-1 (2012), 48-7-29.16(a) (2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 100. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3.1-30.5-7, 6-3.1-30.5-8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
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cannot be carried over or refunded.101  The total amount of tax credits that can 
be awarded during the state’s fiscal year is capped statewide at $7.5 million.102  
Scholarship granting organizations make awards to students who cannot afford 
private school tuition.103  The organizations may not limit scholarship 
availability to students of a single participating school.104  Interestingly, Indiana 
requires participating schools to instruct students with specific curriculum and 
in national and cultural values.105 
6.  Iowa 
Iowa awards a tax credit of sixty-five percent of the amount of the taxpayer’s 
total contribution to a school tuition organization that provides private school 
tuition grants to students from low-income families.106  Unused credits can be 
carried forward for five years.107  For spouses, part-year residents, and 
nonresidents, the amount of the credit depends on the source of the income.108  
The contributing taxpayer may not direct the contribution to one of his 
dependents or to any other specific student.109  There is a statewide cap of $12 
million on the total amount of credits that can be awarded.110  The amount of tax 
credit certificates that each school tuition organization can issue is based on the 
number of students enrolled in participating private schools.111 
7.  Louisiana 
Louisiana provides a tax credit for up to the total amount of a taxpayer’s 
donation to a school tuition organization, provided that the donation is actually 
used to fund a private school scholarship for a qualifying student.112  Donations 
cannot be earmarked to provide scholarships for specific students or schools, but 
donations can be earmarked for students with disabilities.113  The number of 
students at any one school receiving scholarships from a school tuition 
organization may not exceed twenty percent of the school’s total enrollment.114  
 101. Id. § 6-3.1-30.5-9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 102. Id. § 6-3.10-30.5-13 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 103. Id. § 20-51-3-5(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 104. Id. § 20-51-3-5(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 105. Id. § 20-51-4-1(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 106. IOWA CODE § 422.11S(1), (5) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).  Iowa also provides a credit of 
twenty-five percent of the first $1,000 spent for tuition or textbooks for dependents—a contribution 
need not be made through a school tuition organization—as long as the tuition and textbooks are 
not designed to inculcate religious belief.  Id. § 422.12(1)(b), (2)(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). 
 107. Id. § 422.11S(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). 
 108. Id. § 422.11S(4) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). 
 109. Id. § 422.11S(2)(b). 
 110. Id. § 422.11S(7) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). 
 111. Id. § 422.11S(7)(b). 
 112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6301(A)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 113. Id. § 47:6301(A)(3) (Supp. 2013). 
 114. Id. § 47:6301(B)(2)(c) (Supp. 2013). 
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If more eligible students apply than there are number of scholarships, the school 
must use a random selection process.115  However, certain groups, such as 
siblings of enrolled students and students who are attending other private schools 
on scholarship, will receive preference.116  The program also gives first priority 
to students from the poorest performing public schools.117 
8.  New Hampshire 
New Hampshire permits certain business entities to claim a credit against the 
state’s business profits tax or business enterprise tax equal to eighty-five percent 
of its contributions to a scholarship organization.118  No business can receive 
more than ten percent of the total credits awarded state-wide.119  The business 
entity may not direct its contribution to a specific student or nonpublic school.120  
There is an initial statewide cap of $3.4 million of total tax credits that can be 
awarded on a first-come, first-served basis in the first year of the program, 
although a mechanism exists to increase this cap after the first year of the 
program.121  Although the program reduces funding for school districts with 
students receiving scholarships, the program established a stabilization grant 
mechanism to ensure that school districts do not experience a significant 
reduction in revenue.122  The scholarship organizations award scholarships to 
qualifying students to assist them in paying private school tuition (except in 
certain special education situations) or for transportation to public schools that 
are outside of the student’s district and ineligible to receive adequate education 
grant payments.123 
9.  Oklahoma 
Oklahoma provides a credit for fifty percent of contributions made to a 
scholarship granting organization or an educational improvement grant 
organization, capped at $1,000 for individuals ($2,000 for married taxpayers 
filing jointly) and $100,000 for corporate taxpayers.124  The credit increases to 
seventy-five percent of a contribution to an educational improvement 
organization if the taxpayer commits to contributing the same amount for two 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. §§ 47:6301(B)(2)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2013). 
 117. Id. § 47:6301(B)(2)(a)(iv) (Supp. 2013). 
 118. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-G:3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. §§ 77-G:4(I)–(II) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012), 77-G:5(II)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 122. Id. §§ 77-G:7(I) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012), 77-G:8(I) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 123. Id. § 77-G:2(I)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 124. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.206(B)(1) (West Supp. 2012), (C)(1) (West Supp. 
2012). 
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consecutive years.125  Taxpayers can carry forward unused tax credits of either 
type for three years.126 
There is a statewide cap of $1,750,000 for the total amount of tax credits 
awarded to individuals each year, and an additional $1,750,000 cap for tax 
credits awarded to corporate taxpayers, for contributions to scholarship granting 
organizations.127  For tax credits awarded for contributions to educational 
improvement grant organizations, there is a $1,500,000 statewide cap for all 
taxpayers.128  If it appears that the caps will be exceeded, the state Tax 
Commission will establish proportionate shares of the credits so that the total 
amount of credits awarded stay within the statewide caps.129  If one of the tax 
credit pools has not been exhausted, the remaining funds can be added to another 
tax credit pool that has been exhausted.130 
Scholarship granting organizations make private school tuition grants to 
students who cannot afford private schools or to special needs students.131  
Educational improvement grant organizations provide grants to public schools 
to develop innovative or advanced academic programs outside of the normal 
curriculum or early childhood educational programming.132 
10.  Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania provides a tax credit to business entities for seventy-five percent 
of the amount contributed to a scholarship organization or educational 
improvement organization, capped annually at $750,000 per business entity.133  
The percentage increases to ninety percent if the business entity commits to 
contributing the same amount for two consecutive years.134  Pennsylvania also 
provides a one hundred percent tax credit to business entities for the first $10,000 
contributed to pre-kindergarten scholarship organizations and ninety percent of 
the remaining contributions, capped annually at $200,000 per business entity.135  
 125. Id. § 2357.206(C)(2) (West Supp. 2012).  Other limits still apply even to the increased 
percentage.  Id. 
 126. Id. § 2357.206(J) (West Supp. 2012). 
 127. Id. § 2367.206(B)(2)(b) (West Supp. 2012). 
 128. Id. § 2367.206(C)(3)(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
 129. Id. § 2367.206(G)(2)(c) (West Supp. 2012). 
 130. Id. § 2367.206(H)(1) (West Supp. 2012). 
 131. Id. § 2357.206(F)(1)–(2) (West Supp. 2012). 
 132. Id. § 2357.206(F)(12), (14) (West Supp. 2012). 
 133. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8705-F(a) (West Supp. 2013). 
 134. Id. § 8705-F(b) (West Supp. 2013). 
 135. Id. § 8705-F(c) (West Supp. 2013). 
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The total amount of tax credits that can be awarded is capped statewide at $100 
million.136  Unused tax credits cannot be carried forward.137 
Educational improvement organizations make grants to public schools for the 
development of innovative or advanced educational programs that are not part 
of the traditional curriculum.138  For example, pre-kindergarten scholarship 
organizations make grants to pre-kindergarten-aged children for tuition at 
schools that offer pre-kindergarten programs.139  Scholarship organizations 
make grants to eligible students, including disabled students, for tuition at any 
school in Pennsylvania.140  Pennsylvania has also allocated an additional $50 
million for a similar tax credit for contributions to a scholarship organization 
that provides scholarships to financially deserving students and to students in 
low-achieving school districts to attend private schools, in an effort to remove 
students from schools that fail to achieve sufficiently positive educational 
outcomes.141 
11.  Rhode Island 
Rhode Island allows a tax credit for seventy-five percent of the amount a 
business entity contributes to a scholarship organization, and a ninety percent 
credit if the business entity commits to contribute at least eighty percent of the 
first year’s donation for a second consecutive year.142  A business entity cannot 
receive more than $100,000 credits annually, and unused credits cannot be 
carried forward.143  Credits are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, and 
there is a statewide aggregate cap of $1.5 million per fiscal year.144  Scholarship 
organizations provide private school tuition grants to elementary or secondary 
school students who may otherwise struggle to afford private school.145  
Scholarships cannot be directed to only one specific school.146 
 136. Id. § 8706-F(a) (West Supp. 2013).  At least $60 million must be applied to tax credits for 
contributions to scholarship organizations ($8,000,000 of which can be dedicated to  
pre-kindergarten scholarship programs), and at least $30 million must be applied to tax credits for 
contributions to educational improvement organizations.  Id. 
 137. Id. § 8706-F(d) (West Supp. 2013). 
 138. Id. § 8702-F (West Supp. 2013). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  The grant program is discontinued once the student graduates from high school.  See 
id. 
 141. See id. §§ 8701-G.1–8712-G.1 (West Supp. 2013). 
 142. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-62-1, -4 (2010).  The ninety percent credit is available even if the 
second year’s contribution falls below the first year’s contribution, so long as the second year’s 
contribution is at least eighty percent of the amount of the first year’s contribution.  Id.  
§ 44-62-4(e)(3). 
 143. Id. § 44-62-5 (2010). 
 144. Id. § 44-62-3(b) (2010). 
 145. Id. § 44-62-2 (2010). 
 146. Id. § 44-62-2(7). 
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12.  South Carolina 
South Carolina recently enacted a more limited school scholarship 
organization program.  The program took effect in January 2014 and permits 
individuals and corporate entities to claim nonrefundable tax credits for up to 
sixty percent of their total tax liability.147  Taxpayers may not designate specific 
schools or children as the beneficiaries of their contributions.148  Credits are 
awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, with a statewide cap of $8 million 
annually.149 
The scholarship funding organization may award grants of the lesser of the 
total tuition cost or $10,000 for expenses related to enrolling “exceptional needs” 
students in private schools.150  A scholarship funding organization is not 
permitted to make grants for the benefit of a single school.151 
13.  Virginia 
Virginia provides a credit against various types of taxes for contributions 
made to a scholarship foundation.152  The state will credit sixty-five percent of 
the total donation made to a scholarship foundation, so long as the donation 
exceeds $500.153 Credits are only awarded for the first $125,000 in donations 
per individual in a taxable year, but credits are unlimited for business entities.154  
Credits are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, and there is a statewide 
cap of $25 million.155  Unused credits can be carried forward for five years.156  
The scholarship foundations make awards to students who would otherwise 
struggle to afford private schooling or to disabled students.157  Scholarship 
foundations cannot limit awards to students of only one school.158 
B.  Evaluation of School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs 
1.  Arguments Opposing School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs 
One argument against school scholarship organization credits is that they 
generally are not implemented with corresponding accountability regulations on 
 147. H. 3710, § 1.85, 120th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2013). 
 148. Id. § 1.85(B)(2). 
 149. Id. § 1.85(D)(1). 
 150. Id. § 1.85(D)(1)(c). 
 151. Id. § 1.85(A)(7)(d). 
 152. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.26(A) (2013) (providing credits against the individual income 
tax, corporate income tax, bank franchise tax, insurance license tax, and license tax on certain 
utilities). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. § 58-1-439-26(B) (2013). 
 156. Id. § 58-1-439-26(B)(2). 
 157. Id. § 58-1-439.28(C) (2013). 
 158. Id. 
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private schools.159  One area that is often left unregulated is the tuition private 
schools may charge.  Because scholarship organization credits seek to make 
private education more affordable, private schools likely consider the 
scholarships when setting tuition.160  Tuition is thus artificially higher than it 
would otherwise be; the scholarship simply provides a state subsidy to private 
schools without making them more affordable.161 
Accountability within the credit program itself is another concern.162  Direct, 
public educational expenditures are typically subject to yearly reviews for 
reauthorization and re-appropriation of funds, which forces a regular evaluation 
of the return on the investment.163  On the other hand, tax credits often receive 
minimal review after they are enacted and therefore do not benefit from regular 
inspections of their progress and effectiveness.164 
Opponents of school scholarship organization credits also attack them on tax 
policy grounds.  Some commentators argue that using credits to encourage 
quality education potentially violates principles of vertical and horizontal 
equity.165  Horizontal equity is weakened because similarly situated taxpayers 
are not necessarily taxed equally, and vertical equity is weakened because lower-
income taxpayers may not have the means to take full advantage of the tax 
credits in the same manner as higher-earning taxpayers.166 
School scholarship organization credit programs are also criticized for 
furthering the inequities based on income, race, and disability that already exist 
between public and private schools.167  Rather than improving the public 
educational system as a whole, these tax credits merely increase public funding 
of private schools in a manner that is more palatable to the public than direct 
government expenditures.168  Furthermore, minority groups are disadvantaged 
 159. Robinson, supra note 57, at 254. 
 160. Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 184–85. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Robinson, supra note 57, at 259–60. 
 163. Id. at 259. 
 164. Id. (“Random audits will not provide a valid picture of the quality of education or student 
achievement.  The use of tax expenditures rather than a direct program yields a patchy record as 
opposed to a comprehensive, qualitative review for education policy decisions.”). 
 165. Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113. 
 166. Id. at 113–14; see also Deborah Katz Levi, Comment, Tuition Tax Credit Proposals in 
Utah—Their Constitutionality and Feasibility, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1047, 1075 (2005) (reporting 
that the primary beneficiaries of many of these credits—both in terms of the ability to take the tax 
credit and in receiving scholarships from the organizations—tend to be high-income individuals 
whose dependents are already enrolled in private schools). 
 167. Robinson, supra note 57, at 262. 
 168. Id. at 263–64 (“The coupling of public education extracurricular expenses with credits for 
private school costs is a rhetorical, political flourish.  After-school music lessons, a computer at 
home, or even tutoring can enhance educational achievement, but they are not tantamount to 
systemic reforms.  Extracurricular activities are meant to enhance the regular school day, and do 
not address significant reform issues. . . .”).  This effect is particularly noticeable in states like 
Arizona that have provided more significant tax incentives to encourage enrollment in private 
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because, even with the credits, access to private schools remains income 
dependent and thus favors white families.169  Additionally, students with 
disabilities frequently cannot take advantage of credit programs because private 
schools often do not have the resources or expertise to effectively educate 
severely disabled students.170  Finally, providing incentives for students to attend 
private schools may cause the best students to leave the public school system, 
which exacerbates the overall decline in quality of public schools.171 
2.  Arguments Favoring School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs 
Some of the arguments in favor of school scholarship organization credit 
programs are similar to those in favor of voucher programs.  For example, some 
argue that school scholarship credit programs can improve educational quality 
by forcing public and private schools to compete for tax credit dollars.172  Public 
schools will also be forced to improve to prevent parents from seeking out 
scholarships to send their children to private schools.173  Another argument in 
favor of credit programs that resembles arguments for voucher programs is that 
the credits mitigate the “double taxation” problem, whereby parents pay for 
private school tuition while simultaneously supporting public schools through 
property tax payments.174 
Proponents of school scholarship organization credit programs also argue that 
credit programs are superior to voucher programs because they are often 
designed to reach a more economically diverse group of students.175  While 
voucher programs are usually structured to benefit only low-income students, 
schools than the ones that they provide to encourage contributions to public educational programs.  
See id. at 263. 
 169. See id. at 263 (commenting on the relationship between income, race, and private 
education). 
 170. Id. at 264. 
 171. Garnett, supra note 43, at 221. 
 172. See MATTHEW LADNER, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE,  FLORIDA’S LESSONS 
FOR INDIANA K-12 REFORM 13 (2009), available at http://www.edchoice.org/CMSModules 
/EdChoice/FileLibrary/387/IN%20v.%20Fl%20study%200909_red%20and%20blue.pdf; David 
Figlio & Cassandra M.D. Hart, Does Competition Improve Public Schools, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 
2011, at 74, 80 (“[T]he increased competitive pressure public schools faced following the 
introduction of Florida’s Tax Credit Scholarship Program led to general improvements in their 
performance. . . .  The gains occur immediately . . .  implying that competitive threats are 
responsible for at least some of the estimated effects.”); Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113; see also 
generally GREG FORSTER & CHRISTIAN D’ANDREA, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, AN 
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM (2009), 
available at http://www.edchoice.org/CMSModules/EdChoice/FileLibrary/383/FL%20Poll 
%200709.pdf (detailing the impact of the Florida credit program on the quality of both public and 
private education). 
 173. See Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113 (“Tax credits will empower parents to penalize schools 
that are performing below par and force them to become competitive or fail.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 216. 
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school scholarship organization credit programs are frequently designed either 
without income limitations or with limitations that still allow middle-class 
families to participate.176  By diversifying the pool of potential recipients, school 
scholarship organizations pressure schools to tailor their management and 
educational practices to attract as many students as possible.177  Furthermore, by 
increasing the pool of potential recipients, the credit programs inevitably 
increase the pool of potential donors as well.  This diversification of potential 
donors helps to both support existing schools and encourage new schools to 
open.178  Finally, credit programs appear to be legally viable, as evidenced by 
their successful implementation in several states.179 
3.  Arguments Favoring School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs 
Outweigh Arguments Opposing School Scholarship Organization Credit 
Programs 
If the arguments in favor of school scholarship organization credit programs 
do not outweigh the arguments against them, it is difficult to argue that credit 
programs are nevertheless worth pursuing as a mechanism of harnessing crowd 
wisdom.180  Fortunately, the arguments favoring school scholarship organization 
credits outweigh the opposing arguments because the opposing arguments can 
be discredited by careful design of credit programs. 
Accountability concerns are perhaps the most easily addressed.  School 
scholarship credit programs already have significant regulatory oversight 
provisions in place,181 although more may be necessary to prevent fraud and 
 176. Id. at 216–17.  This argument has only developed recently, as early critiques of school 
scholarship organization credits characterized them as primarily benefitting low-income families.  
See H. Lillian Omand, Note, School Choice Legislation: A Supply-Side Market Effects Analysis, 20 
J.L & POL. 77, 89 (2004). 
 177. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 216. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. at 217 (arguing that this multi-state implementation “suggests that the model is 
able to overcome the public choice impediments to any educational choice proposal”); supra Part 
III.A. (describing the successful programs implemented by several states). 
 180. Although crowd wisdom is an important consideration in evaluating a policy choice, it is 
difficult—although perhaps not impossible—to argue that the benefits of crowd wisdom support 
adopting a policy if it would otherwise be harmful.  Crowd wisdom is an important consideration, 
but exaggerating its importance does not justify its use.  In complex policy debates, rarely is one 
factor so important as to be completely dispositive of the issue. 
 181. States have imposed detailed regulatory oversight requirements on school scholarship 
organization credit programs, including certification requirements, reporting obligations, and, in 
some instances, pre-approval of scholarship awards.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6D-9(b) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1184(D) (Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT.  
ANN. § 1002.395(6)–(11) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2A-2–7 (2012); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 20-51-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.11S(5)(c) (West 2011 & 
Supp. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6301(B)(1)(c) (Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT § 77-G:5 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.206(F)(7) (West Supp. 2012); 72 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8703-F, 8704-F (West Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-62-2–3  (2010); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.28 (2013); H. 3710, § 1.85, 120th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2013). 
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abuse.182  If necessary, legislatures or applicable regulatory state agencies can 
add additional oversight measures until accountability is no longer a plausible 
ground for criticizing credit programs.183 
Additionally, although horizontal and vertical equity problems cannot be 
eliminated entirely, they can be mitigated.  Horizontal equity problems can be 
reduced if more schools, including public schools, are eligible to receive funding 
from scholarship organizations.  For example, both Oklahoma and Pennsylvania 
provide credits for contributions to organizations that fund innovative public 
school programs and to organizations that award scholarships.184  Horizontal 
equity problems can be reduced even further if scholarship organizations also 
provide funding to innovative private school programs.185  Although similarly 
situated taxpayers would still not be taxed in an identical manner,186 inequity 
would be reduced because benefits would flow to both public and private school 
students.  Vertical equity problems can be reduced by making the tax credits 
refundable, which would enable all taxpayers to take advantage of them, 
regardless of income level.187 
Finally, the fear that school scholarship tax credit programs will divert badly 
needed public resources and highly capable students from the public school 
system is not as significant as critics may suggest.  The easiest solution is to cap 
the total amount of credits that can be awarded, as many states have already 
done.188  Credit programs can also be designed to provide credits for 
contributions to innovative public school programs, like in Oklahoma and 
 182. See S. EDUC. FOUND, A FAILED EXPERIMENT: GEORGIA’S TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIPS 
FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS 14–22 (2011), available at http://southerneducation.org/getattachment 
/7d5e36c6-8976-4c86-92c5-fca74ddb3530/A-Failed-Experiment-Georgia-s-Tax-Credit-Schol-
(1).aspx; Omand, supra note 176, at 93 (“While no voucher program has yet to be enacted without 
a strong slate of regulations on private schools, tax credit programs seem to be a much weaker 
magnet for regulation.”); Ryan Gabrielson & Michelle Reese, Private School Credits Rife with 
Abuse, MESA TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 2009, at A4. 
 183. Cf. Lindsey, supra note 67, at 115 (explaining that Wisconsin increased regulatory 
oversight of a voucher program to address accountability concerns). 
 184. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 § 2357.206(B)(1), (C)(1), (F)(12), (14) (West Supp. 2012); 
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8702-F (West Supp. 2013). 
 185. See infra Part III.C. (discussing the application of crowd wisdom principles to encourage 
private schools to create better educational programs). 
 186. Differences could arise based on the taxpayer’s decision to contribute to a school 
scholarship organization or based on the school the student attends. 
 187. See Omand, supra note 176, at 87 (explaining that refundable credits can solve vertical 
equity problems, but noting that the solution is not perfect because “refundable tax credits are really 
vouchers with a different administrative mechanism”).  Making the credit refundable would require 
changing many current programs because most states have opted for carry-forwards of unused 
credits rather than refundable credits.  See supra Part III.A.  Phase-outs of the credit at higher 
income levels could also reduce vertical equity concerns, but this would reduce the crowd wisdom 
benefits.  See Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113–14. 
 188. See supra Part II.A. (describing various state credit programs). 
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Pennsylvania.189  Of course, including public schools in scholarship credit 
programs does not guarantee that taxpayers will contribute to public schools to 
the same degree that they contribute to private schools.  Nevertheless, fewer 
public resources are diverted from public schools under these programs than one 
may think, in large part because the programs often grant credits against state 
income taxes and public schools are typically funded by local property taxes.190  
Furthermore, property tax revenues comprise a smaller portion of overall public 
school funding today than in the past, primarily because of desegregation efforts 
and judicial decisions regarding funding equity.191  Finally, any negative effects 
arising from a decrease in school funding may be offset by a corresponding 
decrease in enrollment.192  A decrease in enrollment, particularly if it comprises 
mostly high-achieving students, cannot be blamed entirely on the increased 
availability of private schools.  In the absence of affordable private education in 
cities, families of high-achieving students are unlikely to live in cities in the first 
place.193 
C.  A Proposed Structure for School Scholarship Tax Credit Programs to 
Maximize Crowd Wisdom 
Because the arguments in favor of school scholarship organization tax credits 
generally outweigh the arguments against them, it is worth considering whether 
they are also a viable way of using crowd wisdom to improve educational 
quality.  Although some states have come closer than others in creating a credit 
that could effectively harness crowd wisdom, it is unlikely that any state has 
designed its credit program with this goal in mind.  Therefore, the  programs’ 
design must be modified in order to benefit from crowd wisdom.  School 
scholarship organization tax credits designed to tap into crowd wisdom must be 
modeled to manipulate the pool of people claiming the credits—the “crowd”—
to satisfy each of the four characteristics of a wise crowd.194  Furthermore, to 
use crowd wisdom to justify the use of school scholarship organization tax 
credits, the programs must be structured to ensure that the crowd is wiser than it 
 189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the structure of the Oklahoma and 
Pennsylvania credit programs). 
 190. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 219–20 (noting that the resource diversion argument would 
be more powerful if school scholarship organization tax credits were extended at the local level and 
taken against property taxes).  Of course, the argument can be made that, because public schools 
are often funded primarily by property taxes, credits against state income taxes reduce resources 
available for non-educational government services.  See Omand, supra note 176, at 87. 
 191. Garnett, supra note 43, at 220 (arguing that any decrease in tax revenue would likely be 
felt more by city governments than public schools because school districts are often separate entities 
for tax purposes). 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. at 221. 
 194. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 2, at 10 (listing the four characteristics of a wise crowd: (1) 
diversity, (2) independence, (3) decentralization, and (4) aggregation); see also supra Part I 
(describing the four requirements). 
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would be if it expressed its preferences through balloting or another existing tax 
incentive, such as charitable deductions. 
1.  Diversity 
In order to maximize diversity, a school scholarship organization tax credit 
should be designed to maximize both the number of taxpayers eligible to claim 
the credit and the number of activities that qualify a taxpayer to claim the credit.  
Maximizing the number of eligible taxpayers is relatively straightforward.  The 
credit should be a refundable, so that taxpayers at all income levels can claim it 
if they engage in a qualifying activity.  In this sense, refundable credits are 
superior charitable deductions because charitable deductions are not available to 
all taxpayers.  Additionally, both corporate and individual taxpayers should be 
permitted to claim the credits in order to further expand the crowd.  In states that 
do not impose either individual or corporate income taxes, the credit could be 
applied against sales taxes or property taxes.195  Capping the amount of tax 
credits that can be awarded is not ideal from a diversity perspective because such 
a cap closes the crowd to new members once the caps are reached.  Nevertheless, 
state fiscal realities and the concern that unlimited credits would distort taxpayer 
behavior likely necessitate caps in some form.196 
School scholarship organization credits should be designed to allow the 
organizations to make awards to a variety of individuals and organizations to 
maximize the number of qualifying activities.  This will provide a wider array 
of choices to the crowd than would typically be available at the ballot box.  
Organizations should also be permitted to make awards to assist individual 
students in attending the schools of their choice, regardless of whether the 
schools are public or private.  Some school scholarship organization credit 
programs already authorize this type of award.197  Enabling students to attend 
schools of their choice incentivizes the crowd to contribute to organizations that 
send students to schools that the crowd perceives as achieving better educational 
outcomes.  However, awarding scholarships to individual students does not 
alone sufficiently maximize the choices available to the crowd.  For example, 
although individual scholarships make both public and private schools viable 
choices for the crowd, they also cause schools to focus on competing for students 
rather than on competing with each other systematically to create more 
educational options for the crowd to consider.  This leaves a significant gap in 
the range of options available to the crowd. 
 195. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 220.  Even though property tax credits would likely need 
to be handled at the city or municipal level, it would not be overly difficult to design a city or 
municipal tax credit that would be similar to the types of credits that exist at the state level. 
 196. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 409–11. 
 197. See supra Part II.A (noting that Alabama, Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania 
allow for individual awards). 
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To further increase the number of qualifying activities, organizations should 
be permitted to make direct awards to both public and private schools.198  
Oklahoma and Pennsylvania are good models for this type of program.  Both 
states grant credits for contributions to school scholarship organizations, which 
make awards to students as well as to educational improvement organizations, 
which in turn fund innovative public school programs.199  This is an excellent 
step toward maximizing diversity, but it should be expanded to allow awards for 
innovative programs in all types of schools, including public, private, religious, 
and secular schools.200  Including religious schools is inevitably controversial 
because of the potential Establishment Clause and Blaine Amendment issues.  
However, including religious schools is unlikely to invalidate the programs 
because the transfer of public funds is much more indirect than in voucher 
programs.201  Moreover, including religious schools is critical to maximizing the 
range of options available to the crowd.  If private schools must be incentivized 
to develop innovative programs to attract the resources of the crowd, religious 
schools must be eligible to receive awards because many private schools are 
religious.202 
2.  Independence 
School scholarship organization tax credit programs also satisfy the 
independence requirement of a wise crowd.  Admittedly, there are no discernible 
advantages from an independence perspective to these programs over other 
mechanisms of enhancing crowd wisdom.  Nevertheless, school scholarship 
organization programs promote independence because taxpayers generally make 
 198. In addition to increasing the number of qualifying activities, allowing direct contributions 
to schools to fund innovative programs could increase the pool of potential donors by attracting 
taxpayers who are not interested in funding individual student scholarships, but who are interested 
in funding unique educational programs. 
 199. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the structure of the Oklahoma and 
Pennsylvania credit programs). 
 200. Making awards available to public, private, religious, and secular schools under the same 
criteria is arguably preferable from a constitutional standpoint to providing significantly more 
incentives for awards to students to attend private schools, are often religious.  See Frey & Hogben, 
supra note 42, at 187–89 (comparing Pennsylvania’s program with Arizona’s and arguing that 
Pennsylvania’s inclusion of public schools reduces the potential for successful constitutional 
challenges). 
 201. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (comparing the constitutional validity of 
credit programs and voucher programs). 
 202. See STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS & NANCY L. SWAIN, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013316.pdf (reporting that eighty-six percent of private 
schools were religiously affiliated as of July 2013).  The majority of private schools are religiously 
affiliated because “public schools offer a nonreligious education for free, and nonreligious private 
schools have a difficult time competing with that.  Religious private schools offer something the 
public schools cannot offer, which is why there are so many of them. . . .  In effect, to exclude 
religious schools is to eliminate most choice.”  Moe, supra note 44, at 577. 
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their choices privately, without knowledge of other taxpayers’ choices.203  Even 
if tax credit programs do not increase independence, they are an overall superior 
choice for harnessing crowd wisdom they satisfy and bolster the other elements 
of a wise crowd. 
3.  Decentralization 
School scholarship tax credit programs also vastly enhance decentralization.  
Tax credit programs are better suited to directing resources to solve educational 
problems at a local and regional level than a centralized allocation of resources 
at the national, state, or even municipal level.  Because tax credit programs are 
ideally structured as state or local tax credits (as opposed to federal credits), they 
provide an opportunity for states to incentivize their taxpaying crowds to focus 
their choices on options that are designed to enhance educational quality and that 
ideally will address the particular educational needs of the states’ citizens.  
Because scholarship organizations will be forced to compete at the state and 
local levels for funds, the competing organizations that will emerge will have a 
further decentralizing effect.  These organizations will likely wish to attract 
contributions from taxpayers who can easily be reached through inexpensive 
local marketing and outreach.  Accordingly, to accomplish this goal, the 
organizations will likely direct taxpayer contributions to schools that meet the 
educational needs of a particular region. 
4.  Aggregation 
Finally, school scholarship organization tax credit programs have the ability 
to effectively aggregate individual taxpayers’ choices for the benefit of the 
crowd.  However, an additional mechanism is necessary to aggregate the choices 
of the school scholarship organizations.  Admittedly, this is not as easy as with 
other areas that benefit from crowd wisdom, like stock prices, in which the stock 
market provides the aggregating mechanism.204  One possible aggregating 
mechanism involves the scholarship organizations themselves.  When a 
scholarship organization makes an award to support an individual an innovative 
program at a particular school, it could be required to provide a written statement 
to a centralized agency indicating why it made that particular award.  That 
agency could establish a detailed but limited set of justifications, and the 
awarding organization could elect one—or several—reasons.  The centralizing 
agency could then track the schools that receive the most funding and, more 
importantly, the reasons for which they received that funding.  The agency could 
 203. Of course, no choice is completely private.  Taxpayers may disclose their choice to each 
other, or they may hear a public announcement from an organization about the number of donations 
that it receives.  However, this lack of perfect independence is not fatal, as many other  
decision-making processes operate successfully without absolute independence.  See SUROWIECKI, 
supra note 2, at 91 (stating that independence does not require isolation, but rather “relative freedom 
from the influence of others”). 
 204. See id. at 74. 
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then publish a list ranking funding justifications.  This list would be enormously 
valuable to schools because it would give them a much better sense of the 
priorities that the crowd places on particular facets of schools.205  Although it is 
an admittedly crude mechanism compared to the stock market, a centralized 
agency would still provide a critical counterbalance to the credit programs’ 
decentralizing effects would enable credit programs to effectively harness crowd 
wisdom. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although educational policy decisions involve balancing complex factors that 
make finding a demonstrably correct decision difficult, crowd wisdom can be 
applied to these decisions to produce better outcomes.  Tax credits are a better 
mechanism for harnessing crowd wisdom than the potential alternatives, such as 
direct democratic action or voucher programs.  Specifically, tax credits for 
contributions to school scholarship organizations satisfy all of the requirements 
of a wise crowd and can channel the crowd’s solutions into policy preferences 
that could improve the educational system as a whole.  These programs are still 
in their infancy in the states that have initiated them, and the few existing 
programs likely were not been explicitly designed to maximize the benefits of 
crowd wisdom.  Accordingly, although credit programs are a good starting point 
for the discussion of how tax credits can be used to harness crowd wisdom in 
educational policy, some of their characteristics should be redesigned with the 
explicit goal of harnessing crowd wisdom in mind.  Doing so would add a 
significant benefit to a tax credit program that already effectively addresses the 
problems inherent to other school choice programs.  By improving educational 
policy choices, the wise crowd would literally be helping its future members 
become even wiser. 
  
 205. A list reporting only the schools that receive the most funding would not be nearly as 
helpful.  It is possible that some schools have only one or two strengths and consequently may only 
attract funding from taxpayers and organizations who value those characteristics.  These schools 
would not be reported on a list of schools that receive the most funding.  However, others may also 
value those one or two characteristics, and they could be valuable to the crowd.  The crowd will 
only discover these schools if the agency ranks all contributions. 
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